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Abstract
Americans have had a highly complex love-hate relationship with politics, especially with political ideology.
Recent books on the state of American politics underscore the resentment Americans feel at governments that
have grown bloated and indifferent. And the groundswell of complaints about congressional "gridlock" and
budgetary "train wrecks" seems to show that Americans are particularly impatient with political ideologues
who insist on letting their philosophies, economics, or values get in the way of consensus and problem solving.
Yet tumbling out of every newspaper, radio, and television, now as never before in this generation, is evidence
of Americans' possession by political polarizations defined by some as "culture wars" and by others as
"diversity," by some as "pluralism" and others as a "dictatorship of virtue."
The truth is that despite our supposed contempt for politics we are a passionately political people and derive
our identity as a nation from not a single race, religion, ethnicity, or even language but from a set of political
documents (the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution) and political principles (a highly
democratic form of republic). Almost as if we fear the potentially destabilizing effect of ideological conflict on
a nation held together only by ideas, we take refuge in a paradoxical denial of our passion for politics. We
pretend, as Louis Hartz pretended in his memorable The Liberal Tradition in America (1955), that all
Americans are really united in a common liberal consensus. Or, if we are historians of antebellum America, we
pretend, following the lead of Lee Benson in The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy (1961), that American
political conflicts have been the product of ethno-cultural considerations rather than ideology. [excerpt]
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Review Essay 
ALLEN C. GUELZO 
Phillip Shaw Paludan. The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln. American 
Presidency series. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994. 
378 pp., notes, bibliographic essay, index. 
Americans have had a highly complex love-hate relationship with 
politics, especially with political ideology. Recent books on the state 
of American politics underscore the resentment Americans feel at 
governments that have grown bloated and indifferent. And the 
groundswell of complaints about congressional "gridlock" and bud 
getary "train wrecks" seems to show that Americans are particular 
ly impatient with political ideologues who insist on letting their 
philosophies, economics, or values get in the way of consensus and 
problem solving. Yet tumbling out of every newspaper, radio, and 
television, now as never before in this generation, is evidence of 
Americans' possession by political polarizations defined by some as 
"culture wars" and by others as "diversity," by some as "pluralism" 
and others as a 
"dictatorship of virtue." 
The truth is that despite our supposed contempt for politics we 
are a passionately political people and derive our identity as a na 
tion from not a single race, religion, ethnicity, or even language but 
from a set of political documents (the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution) and political principles (a highly democrat 
ic form of republic). Almost as if we fear the potentially destabi 
lizing effect of ideological conflict on a nation held together only 
by ideas, we take refuge in a paradoxical denial of our passion for 
politics. We pretend, as Louis Hartz pretended in his memorable 
The Liberal Tradition in American (1955), that all Americans are real 
ly united in a common liberal consensus. Or, if we are historians 
of antebellum America, we pretend, following the lead of Lee Ben 
son in The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy (1961), that American 
political conflicts have been the product of ethno-cultural consid 
erations rather than ideology. 
There is hardly a better example of how this paradoxical denial 
has been applied retroactively to the American past than Abraham 
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Lincoln. Despite the fact that the Civil War was the most violently 
divisive political event in American history, Lincoln's biographers 
through most of this century have cast him as a political thinker 
in little except the broadest and most unexceptionable generalities. 
Albert J. Beveridge, a career politician himself, saw Lincoln's Whig 
Party merely as a collection of issues and observed that its mem 
bers relied on the 
"popular idolatry" of Henry Clay as "their chief 
practical asset." Ida Tarbell, who knew what politics was from a 
career in muckraker journalism, also decided that politics in Lin 
coln's case was purely a matter of issues rather than ideology, with 
political contests being "almost purely personal." In the hands of 
J. G. Randall (who in 1940 described both Republicans and Demo 
crats as "a blundering generation" of political morons who stum 
bled into a "needless" war), Lincoln was reborn as a "liberal states 
man" after the model of Woodrow Wilson, thus adroitly but 
ahistorically reincarnating Lincoln as a Democrat. 
All of this would have come as a surprise to Lincoln, to whom 
politics (as William Herndon remarked) was "heaven," whose con 
tempt for Jacksonianism and the Democratic Party was deep and 
long-standing, who admired Henry Clay to the point of hero wor 
ship, and who threw four-fifths of Democratic federal patronage 
holders out of their jobs in 1861 to replace them with Republicans. 
It would also have surprised the Lincoln whose domestic policies? 
the Republican recreation of a "monster" central bank, a paper cur 
rency, and subsidization of the national rail system?clashed at ev 
ery point with sixty-odd years of Jefferson-Jackson dominance of the 
presidency. On those terms, it becomes apparent that Lincoln's ad 
ministration would have been the most stormy and ideological since 
Jefferson's, even if there hadn't been a civil war. Only during the last 
generation?beginning with David Donald's marvelous essay on "A 
Whig in the White House" (1956) and running through the work of 
Gabor Boritt, Daniel Walker Howe, Joel Silbey, Olivier Frayss?, and 
David Greenstone?has the political Lincoln begun to resurface. 
Even then, only in Donald (and, to a limited extent, Gabor Boritt) 
has that reconsideration extended to Lincoln as president. As Donald 
remarked ruefully, interpreting Lincoln as a Whig/Republican po 
litical ideologue is not an avenue to accolades: "So to interpret Lin 
coln's course is to give more significance to the Whig party and its 
ideology than is fashionable among historians today." 
All of this is what makes Phillip Shaw Paludan's The Presidency 
of Abraham Lincoln, the twenty-ninth volume in the University Press 
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of Kansas's American Presidency series, such an important moment 
in the current revival of Lincoln studies. Paludan recognizes that 
the conventional estimates of Lincoln's presidency have ignored 
political ideology and have revolved instead around an image of 
Lincoln as a compassionate political problem-solver trying to bal 
ance his desire to save the Union with his desire to free the slaves, 
with neither the importance of the Union nor Lincoln's ideas about 
slavery having any more context than a noble sentimentality. 
As Paludan sees Lincoln, preserving the Union and ending sla 
very were complementary rather than conflicting goals because 
both were embedded in Lincoln's larger ideological reverence for 
the American 
"political-constitutional system." Constitutional gov 
ernment, or "the constitutional process" (a term Paludan uses as a 
sign for both the Constitution and the democratic ethos by which 
it functions at numerous levels in American politics), required the 
Union for its survival. By the same token, slavery contradicted the 
inherent egalitarianism of the process and therefore had to be con 
tained and eliminated from American life to prevent its taint from 
corrupting that process. 
"Lincoln was not either a constitutionalist or an egalitarian. He 
believed that equality would be realized only through the proper 
operation of existing institutions?and slavery threatened that or 
derly evolution. Lincoln always believed that slavery was wrong 
and that its wrongness lay in its corruption of the realization of 
ideals of equality as they were manifested and given life within 
the entire economic-constitutional-political process" (19). 
This is not only an ideological but also a deeply conservative ver 
sion of Lincoln. Rather than the stealth liberal of Garry Wills's Lin 
coln at Gettysburg: The Words That Remade America (1992) who sub 
verted the Constitution in order to prod us toward equality, 
Paludan insists on a Lincoln who gloried in the "process" and 
confidently expected that equality would be the inevitable result 
if the Union were given a chance to survive intact. And Paludan 
is willing to make this argument passionately; it is as much his con 
viction as that of the Lincoln he describes that "the political-con 
stitutional system, conceived of and operated at its best, inescap 
ably leads to equality." He has no time for those?and he names 
Thurgood Marshall as a prominent example?who complain that 
"the system" was corrupted by such evils as "institutional racism" 
from the start and that it "obstructs the struggle for equality" (xv). 
"The system' too often has been [made] the villain," Paludan ob 
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serves. By contrast, the Lincoln presidency presents modern skep 
tics with a political morality play in which Lincoln can demonstrate 
not only his devotion to the "process" but also how one can make 
it work, even under the severest political stresses imaginable. 
Paludan's book is organized much like a conventional narrative 
of the Civil War era, moving Lincoln year by year from his elec 
tion in 1861 through his brutal assassination. But each chapter and 
each major incident is crafted to yield a dovetailed succession of 
illustrations of Lincoln's skill in winning a war for the Constitu 
tion by the constitutional system's own rules. In the first four chap 
ters Paludan identifies the principal tools Lincoln used within the 
"process": manipulation of the patronage (35-36), beautifully 
honed public rhetoric to "recapture the initiative" when disagree 
ment and obstruction arose (52), the formation of the cabinet (39 
41), presidential control of the military (101), and the management 
of Congress and the Supreme Court (73-87). 
Paludan is aware that it is on the last of these tools that he will 
have to work the hardest in justifying his portrait of Lincoln as a 
constitutional loyalist. Lincoln effectively commenced military ac 
tion in 1861 without congressional approval (Congress was not in 
session, and the House had not organized itself), and he suspend 
ed the writ of habeas corpus not only without congressional con 
sultation but also in the face of Chief Justice Roger B. Taney. Chap 
ter 4 is devoted to demonstrating that Lincoln's unilateral actions 
were in defense rather than defiance of the Constitution. Congress, 
far from taking umbrage, endorsed them at Lincoln's request as 
soon as possible. Then Paludan turns to Taney. Far from seeing Lin 
coln (as Taney did in ex parte Merryman and Prize Cases) as a would 
be dictator bent on tearing up the Constitution, Paludan views 
Taney as the real threat to the Constitution, sticking his unjustified 
nose into parts of the constitutional process where popular will had 
already declared he ought not to go. In a constitutional system, re 
marks Paludan, in tones reminiscent of Robert Bork, elected offi 
cials "should trump appointed judicial obstructionists" (80). 
But Paludan is aware that he has an only slightly less formida 
ble hurdle before him in Lincoln's perversely hesitant path to the 
Emancipation Proclamation, where neither the Constitution nor 
equality but raw expediency seemed to be the guiding star. Begin 
ning in chapter 6, he patiently insists that commitment to the con 
stitutional process, not faintheartedness or racism, ruled Lincoln's 
progress toward emancipation. His gestures toward colonization 
are seen as a placebo offered to appease the disgruntled "even as 
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he was moving toward emancipating the slaves" (132). Even the 
ill-fated Cow Island project was supported only half-heartedly by 
Lincoln as a means of proving that he had actually tried coloniza 
tion and found it wanting. All of this is proof for Paludan that "Lin 
coln wanted emancipation to be a process more than an event" and 
wanted it firmly imbedded "within the existing constitutional pro 
cess" (127). And this, in turn, explains for Paludan the peculiar in 
eloquence of the final Proclamation. Lincoln was writing a lawyer's 
brief not a revolutionary ultimatum and "placing the great deal of 
freedom within the constitutional fabric" (188). As such, Lincoln's 
decision to issue and then stand behind the Proclamation demon 
strates his determination to promote equality, but "within conser 
vative contexts" (189). 
Doing so, as Paludan notes in detail in chapters 7 through 9, 
meant dealing with the imprecations of some of his most radical 
friends, as well as with the cool indifference of some of his most 
important allies. Paludan finds no better illustration of Lincoln's 
skill in dealing with these contending energies and pushing them 
back into the overall constitutional process than his handling of the 
cabinet, one of the major institutions of the "process" Lincoln had 
to use as well as defend. Salmon P. Chase and William Seward be 
come the avatars of the two greatest internal threats to "process 
egalitariansim," radicalism and indifference. 
Chase, the overserious evangelical radical, was the greatest and 
most impatient voice for equality in the Republican Party, and 
Paludan sees Lincoln's selection of Chase as an accommodation to 
those who championed the Declaration of Independence and its 
promise of equality as the heart of American republicanism and 
saw the Constitution as little better than a covenant with death, or 
at least slavery (39-40). Seward, in Paludan's portrait, was a con 
summate politician committed alongside Chase to the principle of 
equality but too at ease with the world as a man of affairs to lose 
sleep over whether equality ought to be delivered tomorrow (40 
41). It was Lincoln's genius to yoke them together?to keep 
Seward's instinct for power from running away with him and to 
keep Chase's malevolent intriguing with congressional radicals 
from stampeding Seward out of the cabinet and Lincoln out of 
office?and create from their rancor a consensus for plans that Lin 
coln had formulated already (180). 
"Lincoln used cabinet meetings as a sounding board to discuss 
the timing or the language of statements for actions he was about 
to take or messages he was about to issue. The real business of gov 
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ernment occurred when the cabinet members worked in their own 
domains and when Lincoln consulted with them one-on-one and 
then acted. Because the major business was fighting the war, the 
president made policy predominately either with Stanton and his 
generals or alone. Cabinet government was an illusion." 
And yet, despite his contention that "fighting the war" was Lin 
coln's 
"major business," Paludan acknowledges that Lincoln was 
at his "most unprepared" in dealing with the military. The U.S. 
Army had been, for most of its history since independence, so ri 
diculously inconsequential a force, in terms of both size and fund 
ing, that there were few precedents for the gargantuan role it was 
called to fill during the war or for the places its generals were ex 
pected to fill. As with the cabinet, it became Lincoln's chief labor 
to force the generals into the constitutional process, or, as in the 
case of George McClellan, to prevent them from subverting it. 
Bending the generals to the constitution, however, required that 
Lincoln also bend a little to the generals and learn enough about 
the problems of strategy, tactics, and logistics to be able to distin 
guish genuine complaint from truculent whining. Especially in the 
case of Ulysses Grant, Lincoln had to distinguish as well between 
an independent military thinker and a disobedient one. And, if 
Alexander McClure was not exaggerating Lincoln's fears about 
Grant's political ambitions in 1864, he also had some struggle in 
establishing that distinction. Paludan feels that "Lincoln's tactical 
understanding remained flawed" but "his larger strategic ideas 
were sound" (207), whereas his use of generals was consistently 
shaped toward subordinating them to his goals and timetable. 
More often than not, the chief weapon Lincoln wields in defend 
ing the process is rhetoric. Paludan reads Lincoln's major addresses 
and state papers?the First Inaugural, the December 1862 message 
to Congress, the Corning and Conkling letters, and the Gettysburg 
Address?as Lincoln's means for defining the nature of the con 
stitutional process and why it must be defended, even at the ex 
pense of Jacksonian notions of popular sovereignty. They are, for 
Paludan, transparent revelations of Lincoln's intentions, and the 
Corning letter in particular provides evidence of Lincoln's deter 
mination to use the bully pulpit of the presidency for "public per 
suasion" of the North and intimidation of the South. "He thus 
reached out to persuade a Constitution-respecting public whose 
opinion was very much a factor in the outcome" (201). 
Paludan's path to his conclusion is clear. When Congress once 
again threatened to overstep the restraints of the process (in the 
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form of Chase's surreptitious bid to dump Lincoln in 1864 and in 
the challenge of the Wade-Davis bill to presidential authority over 
reconstruction), Lincoln successfully faced them down and had his 
action ratified in the ultimate affirmation of the constitutional pro 
cess?the election of 1864. Even the successful conclusion of the 
war is a tribute to the process because Lincoln had sternly subor 
dinated the energies of the Union Army to the implementation of 
civilian policies rather than to the politics of the generals. There is 
no 
sleight-of-hand, no revolution of thought, at Gettysburg or else 
where. What guided Lincoln's presidency is a straightforward, 
ideological commitment to the constitutional process, with Lincoln 
taking as his task the preservation of the process and safeguard 
ing it so that in due time it could bring forth the promised child 
of freedom and equality. "The triumph and irony of his adminis 
tration resided in Lincoln's commitment to the Constitution; with 
out that there would have been no promises to keep to four mil 
lion black Americans" (318). 
What Paludan therefore strives to demonstrate is that Lincoln 
was neither an amoral tyrant nor a pragmatic fixer. He was a po 
litical idealist guided by an overriding vision of the constitution 
and its promise of equality. To the extent that this provides a Lin 
coln of real political substance, Paludan has accomplished what 
almost every other Lincoln biographer in this century has fallen 
short of. And Paludan seems more than a little aware that this sub 
stance has genuine ideological overtones. Lincoln's direction of the 
war "made the Constitution Hamiltonian, not Jeffersonian" (221), 
and the wartime congressional program of land grants, homestead 
legislation, and railroad sponsorship "illustrated the free soil Re 
publicanism that spotlighted the free, self-sufficient individual of 
the nation's Founding" (116). The principal problem, however, is 
that nowhere is a connection firmly established between the pro 
cess and the ideology. Love of the constitutional process is, at best, 
a mechanical love, an admiration of how the system works. Un 
fortunately, nearly everyone in the Early Republic (save perhaps 
Aaron Burr) could claim to be a constitutionalist, including Jeffer 
son Davis and Alexander Stephens, who labored long and hard to 
demonstrate with unrelenting sincerity that they were constitution 
alists who promoted equality, at least for white males. What made 
Lincoln unique, and made him a political ideologue as well, was 
not his constitutionalism or even his expectations of equality. It was 
what that equality meant. 
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On that point, Paludan is only half-right in casting Lincoln's pol 
icies as Hamiltonian; Hamilton's federalism was a dead letter in the 
Early Republic after the election of 1800 and never surfaced again 
except as an insult to throw at those who strayed from the Jefferso 
nian orthodoxy. It was Clay who was Lincoln's idol, and what Clay 
represented was a deep rethinking of the standard Jefferson-Jack 
son line that insisted that the American Republic needed to avoid 
any degree of social or economic volatility that might upset the bal 
ances of class because that would lead to corrupting indulgences of 
foreign luxuries by the newly rich and, eventually, to moral decay 
and civil war. For Clay, American independence depended on com 
mercial development?on banking, trade, and industry?rather than 
on 
agricultural senescence. America, he felt, must enter the market 
revolution in order to survive future challenges. 
Lincoln embraced the Whig ideology from his earliest political 
moments. He left agriculture as soon as he achieved his majority 
and never tried it again. He became a lawyer?the profession 
Charles Sellers has called the "shock troops of capitalism" in the 
Early Republic?and protector of the chief emissaries of the mar 
ket network, the railroads. And he also looked on Democrats, es 
pecially Southern Democrats and their commitment to slavery, as 
a 
symbolic threat to the dynamism of the markets that had allowed 
him to scamper up the ladder of capitalist success. When during 
the great debates of 1858 Stephen Douglas pressed him to define 
equality, Lincoln at once cast it in economic terms: the right of ev 
eryone to eat whatever bread they have earned by the sweat of their 
brow. 
It is this larger ideological context that is missing from Paludan's 
appraisal of Lincoln's affection for the constitutional process and 
that might otherwise give it a larger sense of urgency. Moreover, 
Paludan is so taken up with the theme of Lincoln and the process 
that he fails to focus clearly on the mechanical details of party 
management in Congress and the functions of the cabinet and 
White House staff that are integral to any presidency. Chase, for 
instance, ran a patronage network through the Treasury Depart 
ment that rivaled Lincoln's, and it was a critical element in insu 
lating him from punishment by Lincoln for his outrageous insub 
ordination as a Republican and an administration officer. Yet little 
or 
nothing of this surfaces in Paludan's treatment of Chase. Both 
he and Seward suffer too much at Paludan's hands from being 
typecast as symbols of extremes on either side of Lincoln, where 
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as other members of the cabinet?Bates (far more a party hack than 
Seward), Smith, Usher, Speed, and Blair?hardly garner a mention 
and neither does Stanton's remarkable political conversion from 
Democrat to Republican. 
A number of other vital nuts-and-bolts issues of the 
"process" 
are 
missing as well. Paludan is certainly correct in describing Lin 
coln's relationship to Congress as distant and sometimes confron 
tational, but what is missing is an estimate of why Lincoln was able 
to let Congress out on such a long leash and still retain control of 
the war's direction. How did the Republican Party caucus in the 
House and Senate and the critical committee chairs (especially 
Banking and Ways and Means) relate to Lincoln, and how did they 
function on their own? How, too, did Lincoln's personal staff op 
erate in channeling his political contacts, his reading, his mail, and 
his state papers? John Nicolay and John Hay hardly surface at all 
in Paludan's narrative. In that light, Paludan's view of Lincoln's 
presidency is constricted. Lincoln alone fills the screen, and 
throughout the book no reference is made to the Washington news 
papers, that great treasure-trove of political insights and infights, 
or to the letters and papers of members of Congress, administra 
tors, or to the corps of political horse-holders. Almost all the cita 
tions in the notes are to already published sources. 
Most fundamental of all, however, is the question of Lincoln's 
notion of the constitution, or rather its symbolic place in his world 
of political values. There is a strong case to be made for the priori 
ty of the Declaration of Independence not the Constitution in Lin 
coln's mind, in part because prewar democrats had made a fetish 
of the Constitution's protections for slavery and in part because 
exalting the place of the Declaration offered Republicans a means 
for appealing to the original intent of the Constitution and dodg 
ing the accusation (especially after Dred Scott) that they were de 
fying the law of the land. The Declaration also had a ringing an 
nunciation of equality that Lincoln came to identify with the "right 
to rise" in an economically dynamic society. The Declaration was, 
in Lincoln's appropriation of the biblical simile, the apple of gold, 
with the Constitution serving only as the picture of silver. 
The Declaration spoke the American gospel to the hearts of im 
migrants and made them a new people. "Half of our people. . . 
have come from Europe," Lincoln commented in 1858, and for most 
of them the Constitution was little more than a procedural docu 
ment. "But when they look through the old declaration of indepen 
dence," he added, people find principles that put American nation 
This content downloaded from 138.234.152.108 on Fri, 21 Mar 2014 12:20:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Allen C. Guelzo 51 
al identity on a plateau transcending race, culture, or national ori 
gin. "They feel that that moral sentiment taught in that day evi 
dences their relation to those men [the American revolutionaries] 
. . . and that they have a right to claim it as though they were . . . 
flesh of the flesh of the men who wrote that Declaration." 
Although that certainly did not demean the Constitution or abate 
the force of Lincoln's promise in the First Inaugural to regard his 
oath to preserve and defend it as "registered in heaven," it did 
mean that the Constitution and its 
"process" was a means, not al 
ways elegant and not an end. Paludan does not necessarily disagree 
about the order of that relationship, and yet the process all too of 
ten threatens to swallow the ideological substance Lincoln based 
on the Declaration. 
Still, even with these hesitations registered, this is clearly an en 
gaging and iconoclastic work. Paludan has skillfully synthesized 
the sprawling jumble of Lincoln scholarship. He has resuscitated 
a conservative Lincoln from not only the hands of J. G. Randall and 
Garry Wills but also from such pseudo-conservative boll weevil 
Lincoln-haters as Wilmoore Kendall and M. E. Bradford. Paludan 
has deftly performed the considerable task of harmonizing his ba 
sic thematic developments with a chronological narrative of the 
war years. Most important of all, he has forced upon the new gen 
eration of Lincoln scholars (even now emitting a new flood of Lin 
coln biography and research) an imperative to consider Lincoln as 
a politician and man of political ideas. We may, with no little re 
lief, retire Randall on Lincoln's presidency at last. On that subject, 
for at least the present, Paludan's The Presidency of Abraham Lin 
coln must hold the seat of honor. 
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